Why Emirates TNZ will win The America's Cup - 2

by Richard Gladwell on 20 Jun 2007
Today we continue Sail-World NZ’s look at the 32nd America’s Cup Match, analysing what we see as the points of difference between the Challenger, Emirates Team New Zealand and the defender, Alinghi.

Earlier in the week, we looked at the history and the fact that supported a 5-0 win.

We also looked at the experience of the three helmsmen, their backgrounds and strengths and why we thought Dean Barker would prevail.

The departure of Russell Coutts and his Team Magic in May 2000 proved to be a fatal loss for Team New Zealand in 2003. We looked at what this group took from Team NZ and bought to Alinghi, and then the impact on Alinghi of the subsequent departure of Russell Coutts.

The two styles of the campaigns were also compared, with Alinghi yet to announce their helmsman and Emirate Team New Zealand confirming their helmsman back in 2003.

At the time of writing, neither Emirates Team New Zealand or Alinghi had announced their crew for the first race of the 32nd Match, and Alinghi have not yet named a helmsman. However most are expecting it to be Ed Baird, who worked with skipper Brad Butterworth as a tuneup helmsman with Team New Zealand. Alinghi still have 12 of the 16 crew who sailed in the 2003 Cup, and it is likely that many of these will be in their starting lineup for Race 1.

Emirates Team New Zealand had few crew changes during the Louis Vuitton, particularly in the aft end of the boat as combinations were worked together and communication developed.

The need to have quick and accurate decision making in the mix of tactics and weather, was a standout feature of the Louis Vuitton Cup. The relationship between the afterguard and weather team was also critical.

Lead changes rare

As we saw from the last set of statistics, in over 60 legs sailed, there was only one lead change after the first mark from the Semi-Finals to the Finals of the Louis Vuitton Cup. There is a similar pattern over the last three America’s Cup Matches, in that of 30 races sailed, only once has the boat which has led around the first mark not won the race.

Winding back from the first mark, in the Louis Vuitton Cup, there was a high probability that the yacht which had the advantage on the right hand side of the course by the mid-point of the beat, retained that advantage at the top mark and thereby the race.

This then gets us into the realm of who wins the first cross wins the race, which is not quite game-over, but they certainly have the advantage.

Same too, off the startline, where there is a trade-off for startline position and being first across the startline, albeit at the left hand end.

NZL-92 was generally strong in this regard and improved significantly as the Louis Vuitton Cup progressed.

NZL-92 demonstrated two clear modes being able to foot and point – without significant loss of speed over her opponent. Her shortcoming was when she came off the port end of the startline, and proceeded into the lefthand side of the course, which almost never seemed to be favoured with pressure and shifts required to be able to get into that corner, and out again, with a crossing advantage from a favourable double shift.

In the Finals we saw NZL-92 tack early after the start, go with Luna Rossa into the right, and build some lateral separation by pointing higher than ITA-94 to be able to have a clear leeward advantage when they hit the starboard layline.

Against Alinghi we can probably expect to see similar tactics.

The difference between Luna Rosa and Emirates Team New Zealand was that Luna Rossa seemed to sail a more intuitive tactical style – based around the undeniable brilliance of their tactician Torben Grael, where Emirates Team New Zealand seemed to use the thinking of a wider group in the back end of the boat. This process had its issues early in the regatta, but as the winds stabilised in direction, and the tactical group’s communication improved, they seemed to be able to call it right more often and more quickly, and were able to prevent small errors becoming big ones.

A key strategy from Emirates Team New Zealand was to stay in contact with their competitor, even though NZL-92 was leading, rather than adopting the strategy of taking a risk, to build more margin and a comfortable lead.

NZL-92 ability to defend a small lead was shown in the first race of the Final where she established a small two length lead around the first mark and then had the ability to defend this downwind, largely through good boat positioning and keeping clear air.

They were helped by the Italians reluctance to 'heat up the angle' to power over NZL-92. This ability was one of Alinghi’s strengths in 2003, where SUI-64 rolled NZL-82 in the latter stages of the final run in Race 2 by turning in a the remarkable figures of a high boatspeed but zero VMG, during the passing manoeuvre. Look for an aggressive attack by Alinghi in this circumstance in the current Match.

Crew work will be crucial

In terms of crew-work, Emirates Team New Zealand was outstanding. Again improving as the Louis Vuitton Cup progressed. Alinghi will have to match a high standard in this area if they are to be competitive, and be able to retain a lead.

Picking between the Challenger and Defender in these areas is very difficult as they have not match raced against each other for almost a year, and were then in different boats, and now with the Defender not having named a helmsman or made announcements as to crew.

It is likely that the trends we saw develop in the Challenger Selection Series - such as the high and improving standard set by Emirates Team New Zealand; the high reliance on an accurate wind prediction just before the start; the need to maintain good contact with the right hand side of the course, are likely to continue for the America’s Cup Match.

This will be the first ever match where the Defender has not defended on their home course. The inherent advantage of growing up with the nuances in wind shifts and behaviour is gone, and to a great extent Alinghi are competing on a level basis with the Challenger.

The test here is whether the Defender has been able to set up an in-house program that is as good or better than the Challenger has been through with the Louis Vuitton Cup.

During the heavier-air race against Desafio Espanol, it was apparent that NZL-92 had done a lot of heavy air training. Their matchracing tactics at the start were quite different from those used in lighter winds, and they quickly had the advanatge against the Spaniards. When the boats started, NZL-92 was very quickly into her work, snugged down and sailing well. ESP-97 struggled, took on water and clearly was not comfortable in these conditions. Emirates Team New Zealand put in a good summer program on the Hauraki Gulf in these testing conditions and their performance reflected that.

Valencia tests the sailing crews

We, and others, were quick to query Valencia in the early days when the wind failed to show; but as the summer has built, the breeze has stabilised to some extent, however it still throws down a good proportion of curved balls.

Now the Valencia course is providing a very good test of sailing and is rewarding tactics that are quick and accurate. The decision making process has swung from rewarding the seat of the pants brilliance needed in the early days of the regatta when big wind shifts and pressure variances spanned the width of the course, to one where a more considered approach is required.

In the latter stages of the Louis Vuitton Cup, we would see maybe one or two opportunities to get on the right side of a couple of significant shifts, and the team that saw and grabbed these generally went onto win.

For the Challengers, working and honing their skills in this theatre has been easy, in that they are working i