Rise of Piracy and Other Maritime Insecurity in Somalia

by David H. Shinn, Adjunct Professor, Washington Uni. on 13 Apr 2009 When you read the stories of horror and heroism in Somali waters, are you asking 'Why can't the world of nations, with their great combined power, DO SOMETHING about piracy in Somalia?' If your answer is 'yes', you may like to read this article with excellent background information by David Shinn, Adjunct Professor at the Elliot School of International Affairs at Washington University, from the http://www.eastafricaforum.net/about/!East_Africa_Forum .
(For more information about David Shinn, see short bio at the end of the article)

Two Caveats

Let me begin with two caveats. First, all of my information comes from open sources; those of you with access to classified information on this subject may be disappointed with some of the lacunae in my presentation. The best open source reporting I have seen on this topic comes from Jane’s Intelligence Review. Second, I am not a lawyer and my analysis may run roughshod over some of the legal nuances of the problem, which are important, but which should also yield to common sense. I apologize in advance to those of you familiar with inside information about Somali piracy and to the lawyers who read this. I will be provocative.

Dangers along Somali Shores

Maritime travel along the Somali coast has long been a dangerous business. My own official connection with Somalia began in 1969 as the State Department desk officer for Somalia. For the next two years I spent about a quarter of my assignment supporting the U.S. embassy in Mogadishu in obtaining the release from Somalia’s Siad Barre government of two American flagged vessels that had been captured in separate incidents off the Somali coast on the grounds that they were spy ships. In fact, they were privately owned geophysical research ships that had finished their oil prospecting work in the Persian Gulf area and were returning to the United States. It took months to convince the Somali government to release the ships and their crews. This was not piracy, but it provides an early example of the hazards of sailing along the Somali coast.

Piracy has been a problem in the waters off Somalia for at least ten years. Between 2003 and 2007, there were about fifteen successful or attempted pirate attacks off Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden each year. In 2008, the number of attacks jumped to well over 100; different sources use different numbers based on differing interpretations of pirate attacks. At least forty of the attacks in 2008 involving about 800 crew members were successful. This dramatic increase attracted the attention of the international community. The seizure of a Ukrainian vessel transporting $30 million worth of T-72 Russian tanks, grenade launchers and ammunition and a Liberian-flagged tanker carrying $100 million worth of Saudi oil to the United States underscored the concern. The pirate attacks shifted from the Mogadishu area to the Gulf of Aden at the end of 2007. Estimates on the amount of ransom money collected by the pirates in 2008 range from $30 million to $120 million. This may not sound like a lot as the United States distributes bail out money, but it is huge sum for impoverished Somalia. In addition, piracy has caused insurance premiums for a single transit through the Gulf of Aden to rise from as low as $500 to as much as $20,000.

The Legal Background

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea defines piracy as any illegal acts of violence, detention or depredation committed outside territorial waters for private (rather than political) ends by crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft against another ship, persons or crew. On the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of a state, any nation may seize a pirated ship, arrest the pirates, and seize the property on board and submit the matter to its civil and criminal courts. Only warships and military aircraft or vessels in government service may exercise this authority.

In 2001, the International Maritime Organization adopted a code of practice for investigating piracy and armed robbery against ships. President Bush signed in 2007 a comprehensive and sweeping policy governing diplomatic and legal action to fight piracy. The policy emphasized collaborative strategies by states and the maritime industry to prevent pirate attacks and other criminal acts of violence against U.S. vessels, persons and interests. In 2008, the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling on all states to cooperate in counter-piracy actions off the Somali coast. It authorized operations inside Somalia’s territorial waters to deny that area as a safe haven for pirates who operate outside the 12-mile limit.

At the end of 2008, the United States sponsored a UN Security Council resolution that authorized countries to 'take all necessary measures ashore in Somalia, including in its airspace' to capture those persons using Somali territory for piracy. Defense Secretary Gates quite properly poured cold water on this initiative by pointing out that the international community does not have adequate intelligence to carry out land-based seek and destroy missions against pirates. The U.S. Fifth Fleet commander echoed this view. While there is no harm in having this UN resolution on the record, since its passage I don’t believe it has ever been used.

In January 2009, the United States and the United Kingdom signed a memorandum of understanding with Kenya that permits them to hand over to Kenyan authorities captured pirates for prosecution. Kenya emphasized that this should not constitute an open door for dumping pirates onto Kenyan soil. It remains to be seen ho effective this collaboration will be.

Also in January 2009, nine countries—Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, the Maldives, the Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and Yemen—signed an agreement to cooperate in preventing ship hijackings and apprehending pirates for arrest and prosecution. Known as the Djibouti Code of Conduct, it allows one signatory country to send armed forces into another signatory country’s territorial waters to pursue pirates and, in some cases, to jointly conduct anti-piracy operations. The fact is, however, that all of these countries have extremely limited capacity to deal with pirates and the code is largely meaningless.

Somalia is not party to most of the relevant international treaties and does not have any counter-piracy legislation. Because no central authority controls Somalia, however, the point would be moot even if it had counter-piracy legislation. The Somali Transitional Federal Government did concur with the UN Security Council resolution that allows foreign forces to engage in hot pursuit of pirates on Somali territory.

Who Are the Somali Pirates?
The pirate groups cut across Somali clan lines and tend to live along the coastline. The number of Somalis involved in piracy has been estimated as high as 1,500. The unit operating out of Kismayu in southern Somalia comprises pirates from the Hawiye, Darod and Bantu clans. One of the senior commanders is a Marehan while the Bantu are former fishermen. Pirates operating out of Harardheere north of Mogadishu are dominated by the Suleiman sub-sub clan. They use El Dere and Hobyo as supply bases and the inland towns of Galkayo and Garowe in Puntland as logistical and financial hubs. According to Jane’s, Pakistani and Sudanese nationals help plan the piracy operations out of Harardheere. There are regular contacts between the pirates in Kismayu and Harardheere. Darod groups have a base further up the Indian Ocean coast at Eyl and at the major Gulf of Aden port of Bosasso.

Somalis are exceptionally entrepreneurial. Piracy is a way to make money. There is no evidence that piracy is directly linked to international terrorism, although many Somali groups get a cut of the ransom money. Jane’s has identified a close link between the pirates and the extremist al-Shabab group,